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Introduction
Economies can be integrated in a variety of ways. The starting point of this paper is that the elimination of political and economic borders also revises people's social space and their comparators. In large measure, the speed of this revision depends on the manner of integration. Here we review a unique form of integration -currency unification in Europe -in sequence of enlargements of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The introduction of a common currency is an instrument of fundamental change in economic and social relations in general, and in interpersonal comparisons of earnings, pay, and incomes in particular.
Although, prior to the introduction of the euro as a common currency, individuals in specific European countries were able to compare their incomes with the incomes of individuals in other European countries, the comparison was not immediate, it required effort to convert incomes denominated in different currencies, and it was presumably not done very often. (We return to this point both below in this section, and in our concluding remarks). When a single currency is introduced, the comparison environment changes, enabling, indeed inviting, simpler comparisons with others. For example, with currency unification, workers who perform the same task and who are employed by a manufacturer with plants located in different EMU countries can compare their earnings with each other directly, effortlessly, and routinely. Such comparisons, implicit or explicit, bear on wellbeing.
The purpose of this paper is to link empirically the superadditivity property of aggregate relative deprivation, ARD, which is a measure of social stress, with monetary integration. Holding individuals' incomes constant, the superadditivity theorem of ARD states that a merger of populations increases the ARD of the merged population as compared to the sum of the levels of ARD of the constituent populations when apart (Stark, 2013) . Accordingly, we document the superadditivity of ARD when incomes are held constant.
Admitting, however, that incomes can change upon integration (for example as a result of increased efficiency), we also inquire whether superadditivity of ARD still arises when incomes change.
Our usage of ARD as a measure of social stress builds on the notion that relative deprivation is a source of, and constitutes a measure of, individual stress. Support for this link comes from a large empirical literature in domains ranging from economics to physiology (for a review, see the Appendix in Stark, 2013) . We do not contend that a monetary merger is a cause of rising stress in and by itself; rather, we consider a monetary merger to constitute an act that pushes out the boundary of the sphere of comparisons; and we maintain that this expansion brings about aggregate (social) loss: while upon expansion there can well be losers and gainers, the sum of the losses is larger than the sum of the gains. A simple example serves to illustrate. To this end, and as formally displayed below, let the stress (relative deprivation) of an individual with a given income be the sum of the excesses of incomes divided by the size of the population, and let the aggregate stress (ARD) of a population be the sum of the levels of stress of the individuals. When a setting in which an individual whose income is 1, henceforth "1," (and similarly for other individuals) compares himself only with 2 (with an aggregate stress in population (1,2) of 1/2), and 3 compares himself only with 4 (with an aggregate stress in population (3,4) of 1/2) changes to a setting in which each of 1, 2, and 3 compares himself to all those who are to his right in the income hierarchy, the aggregate stress in population (1,2,3,4) is higher than 1/2 + 1/2 (it is now 5/2), even though the stress of 3 is lowered (from 1/2 to 1/4) yet the levels of stress of 1 and 2 increase by more (from 1/2 to 3/2 in the case of 1, and from zero to 3/4 in the case of 2), and this combined change lowers aggregate wellbeing. Relative deprivation as a cause of individual stress may help explain several empirically noted tendencies. For example, surveys reveal that people from countries that have not as yet adopted the euro expect the consequences of a common currency to bear more positively on their country than on themselves personally (European Commission, 2007) . Likewise, a majority of respondents expect that conversion into the euro will have negative consequences at the personal level (European Commission, 2014).
Our main claim then is that there is a downside, a cost, to monetary unification, and we seek to identify the range within which this cost falls. This claim rests on the assumption that currency integration revises and expands the comparison domain. If monetary unification had no impact on the intensity of inter-country comparisons, the cost to individuals would be nil. If prior to monetary unification no inter-country comparisons were made, whereas postunification comparisons are made by all, then the cost is at its maximal value. In reality, the cost is likely to be in-between. Moreover, to the extent that adaptation to and usage of a new currency as a benchmark for calculating costs and comparing incomes is a gradual process, the full brunt of monetary unification on ARD will take time to be felt, so unification in a given year will have its full impact only years later. In principle, we can define a parameter
and find out its value, for example by asking what proportion of (a sample of) people in a given country compared their earnings with people in another country both before and after unification, and then use the difference between the two shares as an estimate of  . Correspondingly, our reported changes in ARD could be recalibrated upon being multiplied by  . The parameter  may well change (presumably increase) over time. Surveys investigating the extent to which the euro plays the role of a mental benchmark for price calculations (albeit international income comparisons within the EMU have not been investigated this way) reveal that people in the EMU stop converting sums from the euro to their former national currency only gradually. For instance, in 2013, 68% of the respondents did not usually convert from the euro into the old national currency when making routine purchases, and 50% behaved likewise when making exceptional purchases such as the acquisition of a car or a house (European Commission, 2013) . In comparison, the euro was treated as a mental benchmark for routine purchases by 59% of the respondents in 2008, and by 46% in 2003, while for exceptional purchases it was 34% of the respondents in 2008 , and by 16% in 2003 (European Commission, 2010 . We can likewise conjecture that  depends on a variety of socio-demographic characteristics, and on the respondents' country of origin.
In the remainder of this paper we proceed as follows. In Sub-section 2.1 we introduce our measure of ARD. In Sub-section 2.2 we allude to the data that we use. In Sub-section 2.3
we present the methodology that we employ. In Section 3 we display the results of our calculations of the impact of six monetary unifications on ARD. We conclude in Section 4.
2.
Measuring aggregate social stress, data, and methodology
Measurement
As in Stark (2013) , we define the ARD of a population -an index of its level of social stressby the sum of the levels of stress experienced by the individuals who constitute the population. We refer to income-based comparisons, and we quantify the stress of an individual by the sum of the extra income units that others in the population have, normalized by the size of the population (assuming that the comparison group of each individual consists of all the co-members of his population).
The ARD of a population of n members with an ordered vector of incomes
RD x is the relative deprivation experienced by individual i .
In order to assess empirically whether or not the superadditivity of ARD holds in the EMU context, we will compare the ARD of the euro area following monetary unification with the sum of the pre-merger levels of ARD of the countries forming the union. In the calculations reported below, we resort to an equivalent expression of ARD:
where   i F x is the fraction of those in a population of n members whose incomes are smaller than or equal to i x , and   Because the EMU enlargements involved integration of more than two populations (countries), we need to check whether the superadditivity property presented in Stark (2013) for two populations applies to 2 l  populations.
Consider then 2 l  merged populations (where l is a natural number). The size of population i P is i n , and the corresponding ordered vector of incomes is
merged population is then of size 1 l n n n   , and the ordered income vector is denoted by
Claim. The aggregate relative deprivation of the merged population exhibits the superadditivity property, namely
Proof. The proof is by induction with respect to the number of merged populations.
From Stark (2013) we know that the superadditivity property holds for 2 l  . We assume that the property holds also for some 2 l  merged populations. We show that it holds for 1 l  merged populations. The 1 l  populations can be merged sequentially; namely, we first merge the first l populations and subsequently merge this new population with the ( 1) l th  population:
By assumption, the ARD function is superadditive for l merged populations:
From the first step of the proof we know that the superadditivity property holds for any two merged populations, so upon merging population 1 2 ... l P P P    with population 1 l P  , we obtain the superadditivity of ARD, namely
which completes the proof. □ Because of Eurostat data limitations, we will calculate the ARD drawing on aggregate data of the Gini coefficient, G ; of population size, n ; and of selected measures used as proxies of mean income, x .
One way of defining the Gini coefficient is as follows:
Thus, we harness data on the three terms in eq. (2). It is worth noting that, as already shown in Stark (2013) , the superaddititivity result is robust with respect to measures of ARD other than
, such as the aggregate of the excesses of incomes, and the distance from the highest income.
Data
We use data for 1998-2011 taken from the Eurostat Statistics Database for 17 EMU member Table 1 , the 17 analyzed EMU member countries were quite diverse in terms of their Gini coefficient, population size, and selected measures of mean income, both before and after the adoption of the euro. Eurostat calculates the equivalised income attributed to each member of a household by dividing the total disposable income of the household by the equivalisation factor. Eurostat applies an equivalisation factor based on the OECD-modified scale giving a weight of 1.0 to the first person aged 14 or more, a weight of 0.5 to other persons aged 14 or more, and a weight of 0.3 to persons aged 13 or younger (Eurostat, 2013) . This choice of variables is dictated both by data availability and the fact that GDP per capita (both in nominal and in real terms) is the most popular and the most often used measure for international comparisons, whereas mean equivalised net income is a measure that seems to be closest to the mean equivalised disposable income. This allows us to calculate the Gini coefficient as:
We are aware of the fact that income distributions usually follow an exponential (Boltzmann-Gibbs) distribution for low and middle-class incomes, and power-law (Pareto) distribution for top incomes (about 3% of the population; Wlodarczyk, 2013) . One way of responding to this consideration would be to employ a lognormal distribution for the bottom 97% of incomes, and a Pareto distribution for the top 3% of incomes. Especially for income comparisons, the top 3% might affect our calculations. However due to lack of data on incomes in both distributions across European countries, we found it is impossible to follow such an approach.
where  is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, and  is the standard deviation (cf. Aitchison and Brown, 1963 To check the robustness of our calculations, we compare the results of the calculations based on eq.
(1), with calculations based on eq. (2) both at the country level and at the EMU level for each measure of mean income (see Table 2 and the note below the Table) . 
where j x stands for a selected measure of mean income in population j.
Aggregate relative difference at the EMU level is calculated as:
where m is the number of EMU member countries at time t. Source: Authors' calculations based on Eurostat (2013) data.
Methodology
As noted in the Introduction, the approach taken in this paper draws on the assumption that the adoption of a common currency revises the social comparison space. Our first take on the data aims at establishing an upper bound: to calculate this upper limit, we assume that prior to joining the EMU, individuals in a country engage only in in-country income comparisons and that, after the merger, individuals switch to (or also make) EMU-wide comparisons. (We comment further on this assumption in the concluding section.) An empirical depiction of the superadditivity property comes down to measuring the difference between the ARD calculated for the EMU as a whole (after the merger), and the sum of the levels of ARD calculated for each merged-in population, when both calculations are based on the reconstructed income vectors.
Aggregate relative deprivation in the EMU enlargements
The EMU was created in 1999 by eleven countries, with other countries joining in 2001, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2011, 2014, and 2015 . Thus, until 2011 we have six occasions of EMU creation and enlargement. We calculate the change in ARD following these six monetary unifications for each measure of mean income. We look at data for the nearest point in time which, in our case, is the subsequent year. This time lag is long enough to give people the opportunity to endogenize the change. The results are displayed in Table 3 .
Taking into account that changing population size may also impinge both on the combined and net effect, we also replicate the calculations assuming that population size does not change between time t-1 and time t (see Table 4 ). The calculations are conducted for the following measures of mean income: a) GDP PC -nominal GDP per capita, b) GDP PC PPS -GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Standards, c) MENI -nominal mean equivalised net income, d) MENI PPS -mean equivalised net income in Purchasing Power Standards. Calculations are conducted in euro and then rounded. The Table includes aggregate values and does not depict differences in the rate of growth of income in particular countries, nor differences in the rate of growth of individual incomes. "Aggregate income growth rate" refers to the aggregate increase of income of all countries participating in particular EMU enlargements calculated as: x stands for a selected measure of mean income in population j at time t, and * t m is the number of countries participating in the EMU event at time t. "Combined effect" refers to a situation whereby both a revision of social space takes place, and incomes are allowed to change. "Superadditivity (net effect)" is the "pure" effect of the revision of social space when income growth is netted out. Source: Authors' calculations based on Eurostat (2013) data. 
Superadditivity (net effect) (7) = (5) - Columns 4 and 5 in Table 3 and 4 show that on five out of the six enlargements, the combined effect on ARD of the revision of social space and economic growth within the EMU was positive. In 2009, due to exogenous factors associated with the global financial crisis which affected Europe strongly, the combined effect on ARD of the revision of social space and economic growth was negative for both measures of income based on GDP. However, when we factor out the influence of the 2009 contraction of nominal GDP in the EMU, we obtain an effect similar to those prevailing in the other five enlargements. Therefore, we infer that for the "pure" (namely, purged of GDP change) ARD, superadditivity obtains throughout (column 7), notwithstanding the three (negative) "outliers" that are quite close to zero and presumably could be linked to fuzzy data, especially in the case of Greece.
The largest increase in ARD occurred when the EMU was created in 1999. For example, for GDP per capita (with changing population size) the ARD of the combined eleven EMU members was 12.8 percent higher than the sum of the levels of ARD of the constituent countries just prior to the formation of the EMU. comparison environment reduces their ARD), whereas poorer countries incur a social cost of increased ARD. This is a demonstration of an uneven distribution of the costs and benefits from monetary integration over EMU countries when these costs and benefits are evaluated in terms of ARD.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we document the superadditivity of ARD in a setting in which diverse currencies were replaced by a common currency, an act that enabled and invited an expanded comparison environment. Tracking the sequence of EMU changes from its initial creation in 1999, reveals both higher post-merger levels of ARD and a non-uniform distribution of ARD costs and benefits. (In ARD terms, monetary integration favors the richest countries.)
Two general comments are in order. First, the adoption of the euro as a common currency is perhaps the starkest act that entails revision of the set of comparators, but it is not the only one; conversion to the euro is associated with an entire set of standardizations, all rendering comparison with other people more compelling, and almost unavoidable. Second, our numerical results are based on the assumption that prior to monetary unification individuals did not compare themselves with individuals in other countries, and that within a year after unification they did. To the extent that reality is less cut-dried than this dichotomy, our results constitute upper limits.
What are the economic consequences of the observed increase of ARD for the EMU countries? For instance, is it the case that in the wake of the EMU, intensified cross-country wage comparisons contributed to higher wage demands in countries inflicted with rising (sharply rising) ARD than in countries not experiencing rising (or only mildly rising) ARD?
Should policy makers consider and implement measures aimed at redressing the uneven distribution of ARD costs and benefits among EMU member countries? Are the increasing social stress and uneven distribution of ARD costs and benefits among EMU countries a good enough reason to dull significantly the shine of the euro? Further research could test whether the results generated by the ARD measure correlate with feelings of individual deprivation reported in surveys. The relationship between ARD and intra-EMU migration will also be worth investigating because labor mobility is, to an extent, linked to wage differentiation and can be accentuated by increased wage transparency.
Finally, it is tempting to speculate about the consequences of recent EMU enlargements such as Latvia becoming the 18th EMU member state in 2014. Latvia is a small country characterized by the lowest levels of all analyzed measures of mean income in the EMU. If Latvia had joined the EMU in 2011, its ARD would have risen by multiples (see Table 5 ). For example, reading through the a) line in Table 5 , we see that in 2011 Latvia's ARD calculated on the basis of GDP per capita was about 7.1 billion euro. If Latvia had joined the EMU in 2011, its ARD would have been equal to 39.9 billion euro. And after encompassing Latvia, the current EMU countries would have gained an ARD equivalent of 17.3 billion euro.
Altogether, the ARD of the EMU as a composite entity would have risen by 22.6 billion euro. To aid interpretation: as per the Note above, gains in terms of GDP per capita occur -the thin solid line is above the thick solid line -which means that if individuals in France switch from within-country to within-EMU comparisons, they will feel less relatively deprived in aggregate terms. On the other hand, a thick dotted line above thin dotted line means that if individuals in France base their income comparisons on GDP per capita PPS, switching to within-EMU comparisons increases their ARD.
